CIAER IM 75-022 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM OPEC: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Approved For Release 2001/08/21; dta-RDP86T00608R00000180021-8

DECEMBER 1975 CONFIDENTIAL ER IM 75-22 1 OF 1

Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86T00608R000500180021-6

Confidential

NOFORN (See inside cover)



Intelligence Memorandum

OPEC: The Impact of Technology Transfer

Confidential

December 1975

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OPEC: The Impact of Technology Transfer

SUMMARY

OPEC imports of technology-related goods, such as machinery and transport equipment, which were on the order of \$7 billion in 1973, have soared since the massive hike in oil prices. In 1974 they reached \$12 billion and we expect these imports to approach \$18 billion this year. By 1980 technology-related imports will likely top \$50 billion.

The United States should remain the largest supplier of technology-related products through 1980 followed closely by West Germany and Japan. The US share of the market was 25% in 1974. The West Germans had 20% and the Japanese 17%. We expect these two countries to gradually improve their positions at the expense of the United States.

More than two-thirds of technology-related imports are going to the Middle East, where severe labor constraints dictate a highly capital intensive development strategy. Per capita technology imports by sparsely populated countries such as Saudi Arabia are running 17 times the level of heavily populated Nigeria and 23 times that of Indonesia.

Most imported technology is earmarked for building up the domestic economy and improving living standards. Plans for establishing export-oriented industries are mainly those connected with petroleum, where the oil producers have a competitive advantage. In the 1980s, OPEC probably will have an export capabilit, large enough to have an impact on world markets for petrochemicals and perhaps other intermediate products such as iron pellets.

OPEC countries, however, will not be able to develop high-technology export industries and become competitive with developed countries. On the contrary, each step up the technology ladder will mean more, not less, dependence on the industrialized world. Moreover, Western firms will continue to advance their technology, in part because of their involvement in the huge projects sponsored by OPEC nations.

5X1A9a	Note: Comment	s and queries	regarding	this me	morandum	are welcomed	l. They	may
SX IA9a	be directed to		of the	Office	of Econom	ic Research,	Code	143
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
DISCUSSION

The OPEC Technology Market, 1972-74

- 1. Most OPEC countries had ambitious development programs under way even before the huge 1 January 1974 oil price hike. These programs aimed at rapid modernization through acquiring and absorbing Western technology in all forms, from direct purchases of machinery to technical and managerial assistance and education abroad. The most readily available surrogate for these hard-to-measure flows is technology-related imports scientific apparatus, machinery and equipment, and transport equipment.*
- 2. In the years after the oil price hike, OPEC's technology-related imports soared from \$7 billion in 1973 to \$12 billion in 1974. After discounting for inflation, we estimate that these imports grew 7% in 1973 and by a striking 32% in 1974. The 1974 importation rate is continuing in 1975, based on evidence through midyear.
- 3. Thirteen countries the United States, Canada, Japan, and 10 major European countries accounted for about 95%, or \$11 billion, of the technology-related exports to OPEC in 1974 (see the chart). Other countries, including Communist nations, shipped no more than \$700 million worth of these goods last year. The only major Soviet involvement was in Iran, where the USSR is building a steel plant with an eventual capacity of 4 million metric tons per year.
- 4. Of the technological imports sold by the 13 countries in 1974, 27% consisted of motor vehicles, including large numbers of trucks. Another 19% was nonelectrical machines, not otherwise specified. The remainder was scattered among such items as agricultural equipment, telecommunications equipment, aircraft, and scientific apparatus.
- 5. The United States still is OPEC's largest supplier of technology-related products although its share slipped from 27% in 1972 to 25% in 1974. Venezuela, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia in that order were the leading US customers, taking 70% of our technology-related exports to OPEC countries in 1974.

^{*} Technology-related imports include scientific apparatus (SITC 861) and ail machinery and equipment in SITC category 7, except major household appliances (SITC 725).

Developed Countries: Market Share of OPEC Technology-Related Imports



¹Including Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria.

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- 6. Following the United States were West Germany (20%), Japan (17%), and France (13%). The market share of these three grew from 1972 to 1974 while the UK, Italian, and Canadian shares fell.
- 7. The United States dominates in the export of machinery for special industries, such as the paper, printing, food processing, construction, and mining industries; in the provision of heating and cooling equipment, pumps, powered tools, and forklift trucks and other mechanical handling equipment; and in the sale of aircraft and railway vehicles (see Appendix A).

- 8. Motor vehicles account for one-fifth of US technology exports, although both West Germany and Japan top the United States in motor vehicle sales to OPEC. The West Germans also are strong in sales of agricultural machinery—tractors, dairy equipment, and harvesting and cultivating equipment. Japan shows up especially well in the telecommunications field; its share of these sales jumped from 28% in 1972 to 40% in 1974.
- 9. Middle East countries have been taking more than two-thirds of OPEC imports of technology-related goods. Iran has been the largest customer. Its imports of \$2.2 billion from the West represented 20% of the OPEC total in 1974 and were nearly double those of either of the next two countries, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela with \$1.3 billion each (see Table 1). Algeria and Indonesia followed, with imports of about \$1.2 billion each, and Libya was next with \$1.1 billion. Nearly all of the increase in the value of OPEC imports since 1972 went to the Middle East; in Venezuela, 1974 imports in real terms were 8% less than in 1972.


Table 1

OPEC Countries: Technology-Related Imports from 13 Developed Countries

		Bi	llion US\$
	1972	1973	1974
Total	5.2	6.9	11.3
Iran	1.0	1.4	2.2.
Saudi Arabia	0.5	0.7	1.3
Venezuela	1.0	1.1	1.3
Algeria	0.6	0.8	1.2
Indonesia	0.5	0.7	1.2
Libya	0.4	0.6	1.1
Iraq	0.2	0.2	0.8
Nigeria	0.5	0.6	0.8
Kuwait	0.2	0.3	0.5
UAE	0.1	0.2	0.5
Ecuador	0.1	0.2	0.3
Qatar	0.1	0.1	0.1

10. In addition to technology-related products, foreign technical assistance programs have mushroomed in all OPEC countries, particularly in Iran and Saudi Arabia. The largest programs involve the oil industry. Although the properties of Western firms are being nationalized, the companies are being retained to handle everything from marketing to training of managers and engineers.

11. The United States and other Western countries also are moving into other areas. In Iran the United States is helping train 40,000 industrial workers annually, and approximately 14,000 Iranian students are attending American colleges and universities. In Saudi Arabia the US Corps of Engineers is acting as a contracting agent for military base construction. And US and other Western financial institutions are now helping the oil producers decide how to invest their surplus revenues.




US-designed university of petroleum and minerals near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

New Development Plans

12. In the last two years the OPEC countries have adopted even more grandiose development programs. Multiyear investment plans range from a staggering \$70 billion for Iran and Nigeria, down to about \$9 billion for Libya (see Appendix B). Most of these plans, hastily put together in the rush of new oil earnings, are either unattainable or, as the Saudis indicate privately, are deliberately exaggerated to improve the government's image at home and to stave off a flood of LDC requests for credits. The Saudis also want to point out to other OPEC members that they need the bulk of their oil revenues for domestic development and thus should not have to absorb too disproportionate a share of any cut in oil output needed to maintain prices.


13. In any case the OPEC development programs will be stretched out by serious bottlenecks. Like other less developed countries, OPEC nations suffer from a shortage of skilled manpower, inadequate transportation and communications networks, and a small, technically backward industrial base. They must start nearly from scratch in establishing basic industries such as iron and steel, agricultural machinery, and even petrochemicals for which they are particularly well suited. And they must spend the time and money it takes to provide the necessary infrastructure — from roads and hospitals to a well-educated population. All OPEC states are following a highly capital intensive development strategy with most Middle East countries placing the greatest emphasis on this approach because severe labor constraints leave them no choice.



Truck route in Iran.

14. For the time being, Iran and Saudi Arabia will be the largest customers for Western technology:

The *Persian Gulf sheikdoms* and *Libya*, with their small populations (see Table 2), will likely become service-oriented rather than industrialized economies, achieving a high standard of living fairly quickly, like Kuwait.



Fractioning tower en raute to a Tehran refinery.

Table 2 OPEC Countries: Economic Characteristics¹

	Population Mid-1975 (Million)	GNP 1973 Esti- mate (Bil- lion US \$)	Fer Capita GNP 1975 Esti- mate (US \$)	Crude Oil Produc- tion 1975 Esti- mate (Tiou- sand b/d)	Total Imports (F.O.B.) 1975 Esti- mate (Bil- ion US \$)	Current Account Balance 1975 Estimate (Billion US \$)	Foreign Official Assets December 1975 Esti- mate (Bil- lion US \$)
Algeria	16.8	13	770	920	6.2	-2.5	1.6
Ecuador	6.7	4	600	165	1.2	-0.6	0.3
Indonesia	131.2	24	160	1,310	4.7	0.0	1.6
Iran	33.2	55	1,660	5,430	13.9	4.2	12.0
Iraq	11.0	13	1,180	2,310	5.2	2.9	5.8
Kuwait	1.0	9	9,000	2,130	2.0	6.3	16.0
Libya	2.4	9	3,750	1,495	4.5	0.5	3.0
Nigeria	63.0	33	520	1,805	5.3	1.4	7.0
Qatar	0.2	1	5,000	405	0.5	1.0	2.8
Saudi Arabia	6.1	30	4,920	7,020	5.6	19.S	38.4
UAE	0.2	6	30,000	1,650	2.4	4.4	11.4
Venezuela	12.0	29	2,420	2,390	5.5	2.5	9.0

^{·1.} Excluding Gabon.

Indonesia, Algeria, and Venezuela, although having much larger populations, will be held back by the limited size of their oil revenues relative to their development goals.

Nigeria, with more than 60 million people and one of the least developed economies in OPEC, will need much more than money to develop rapidly.

Iraq, even with its small population, probably can mount a moderate industrialization campaign, especially if it continues to increase its commercial ties with the West and reduces its dependence on the USSR.

Iran has the best chance for economic modernization because of its large population and a decade of rapid growth on which to build.

Saudi Arabia, although sparsely populated, will spend a good deal of its huge excess revenues on foreign technology. Already, per capita imports of technology are running 17 times the level of heavily populated Nigeria and 23 times that of Indonesia.

Iran

- 15. Last year the Shah of Iran predicted that in 10 years his country would be at the same stage of industrial development as France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom are today. Although clearly unrealistic, the Shah does have a large-scale development program under way.
- 16. Approximately two-thirds of Tehran's investments will support education, housing, transportation, communications, and other basic activities. The remaining third is to be spent on industrial projects based on the country's substantial reserves of coal, copper, iron ore, and of course oil and natural gas.
 - At least a dozen petrochemical plants are in various stages of development, mainly to meet domestic demand for fertilizer.
 - A complete \$6 billion natural gas complex is scheduled, based on Iran's vast reserves possibly the world's largest.
 - Nuclear powerplants worth \$2 billion are planned.

- Five billion dollars in investment is slated to boost steel output from 600,000 tons a year in 1975 to 15 million tor.s by the early 1980s.
- Major new copper facilities are being constructed under contracts with US firms; output of refined copper is expected to reach 200,000 tons in the early 1980s.

Saudi Arabia

- 17. Although concerned that rapid modernization will undermine the country's political and social traditions, Saudi Arabia has by far the most ambitious spending plans given the size of its population. Riyadh plans to devote nearly two-thirds of its outlays to modernize its domestic economy and to upgrade personal consumption. Fifteen billion dollars is allocated to education and social services while \$29 billion is tabbed for transport, communications, housing, and other basic facilities. Twenty-five billion dollars is earmarked for industrialization, based mainly on oil and natural gas resources.
 - A massive \$5 billion gas gathering and treatment system will be built to use the 3.5 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas currently being flared and thus wasted an amount equal to 25% of total Canadian gas production.
 - Five petrochemical plants worth \$3 billion and three oil refineries worth \$2 billion are scheduled.
 - A gas-fired \$2 billion steel complex is to supply some 3.5 million tons per year in the 1980s.
 - Several large-scale desalinization plants valued at more than \$7 billion are planned to provide water for industrial, agricultural, and urban use.
- 18. The industrial plans of other OPEC countries follow the same pattern as Iran and Saudi Arabia on a smaller scale. Major products will include petrochemicals such as fertilizers and plastics and, especially in Algeria, liquefied natural gas. Most countries plan to build steel and alumina plants, and a few are planning to construct automobile assembly plants on the basis of imported component parts.


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Saudi gas being flared.

OPEC Technology-Felated Imports Through 1980

- 19. A number of projects involving large inputs of foreign technology have already been started or are firmly on the books and should be on stream in the 1980s.
 - Most are energy related, including five petrochemical complexes in Saudi Arabia; a complete natural gas complex in Iran; liquefied natural gas plants in Iraq, Algeria, and Nigeria; new or expanded refineries in nearly every major OPEC country; and nuclear powerplants in Iran.
 - Other industrial projects include a complete port complex in Iran, expansion of steel mill capacity in Iran and Venezuela, and telecommunications facilities in Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Iran. Algeria has purchased an electronics plant to produce radios, TV sets, and other consumer items.
- 20. By 1980 the OPEC market for technology-related goods will likely exceed \$50 billion and the United States should continue to receive a large share of the business. The United States leads in the value of contracts signed with OPEC countries and also is benefiting from secondary purchases by primary contractors.



F : more fertilizer complexes will join this US-built plant in Eastern Saudi Arabia.

Most recently, a US firm was given the services contract for Saudi Arabia's \$4.6 billion gas gathering system. Other countries are pressing hard; contracts concluded this year were highlighted by Tehran's \$2 billion purchase of nuclear powerplants from West Germany and France and its \$1 billion port and steel development contracts awarded to the Italians. The Japanese have been winning smaller contracts throughout the area, especially for petrochemical facilities.

Impact on OPEC

- 21. Much of the transfer of technology-related goods to OPEC will go to building up and modernizing the domestic economy rather than developing export-oriented industries. Technology imports will result in better transport facilities, schools, hospitals, and technical institutes and a marked increase in supplies of food, better clothing and housing, and consumer durables.
- 22. Some OPEC countries, nonetheless, will be able to export products turned out by the newly acquired technology. The availability in OPEC, especially in the Middle East, of cheap energy for metallurgical processes and almost unlimited raw materials for petrochemical production provide ideal conditions for establishing plants for aluminum, ammonia, urea, ethylene, plastics, fertilizer, and some specialized steel products. Domestic needs will absorb only a part of the output of chemical and metals; substantial amounts will be available for export. And because the technology will start off at the highest world level and because production often will be supervised by Western engineers, these products should be competitive in the West.



Oil will remain the backbone of OPEC industrialization.

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- 23. In a number of instances, Western firms will share ownership of the facilities with OPEC and/or market the output of the new plants in the West. The Saudis in fact are insisting on active Western participation in new industrial deals to avoid being stuck with large plants whose output cannot be marketed.
- 24. One danger in simultaneous development by several OPEC countries in industries such as petrochemicals is that production could easily exceed world market demand. For the next five years at least the buildup of petrochemical capacity will not have an appreciable impact on world markets. Beyond 1980, however, Persian Gulf producers probably will have a large export capability for such products as ammonia, nitrogen fertilizer, ethylene, and ethylene products. None of the OPEC countries will emerge as major steel exporters, except perhaps in some specialized product areas such as the growing market for metallized pellets derived from plants that use direct-gas reduction technology imported from the West.
- 25. Even though OPEC plants will incorporate advanced Western technology, the OPEC countries will not be able to produce and export any high-technology items. The receipt of technology does not confer a capability to reproduce that equipment, let alone export it.
- 26. Iran, in a better position to assimilate technology than any of the other Middle East OPEC countries, will have to master the production of petrochemicals before it can even consider designing and producing advanced petrochemical equipment. The Iranian assortment of such products as steel, machine tools, and electrical equipment will long remain inadequate for local needs. Moreover, many technicians and middle managers are likely to be absorbed into the burgeoning government bureaucracy or into the defense sector.
- 27. Iran ultimately may be able to export technical services for the exploration and development of oil fields and to provide some less advanced oil field equipment. Even now, all-Iranian companies are servicing certain oil fields in Iran.
- 28. Saudi Arabia's prospects for selling technology-related goods or services are much less than Iran's. Largely because of manpower constraints, they intend to leave technical and management operations to foreigners.
- 29. Growing imports of technology will make OPEC countries more dependent on foreign technology rather than less. As industrialization of the OPEC

countries matures, they will need a continuing inflow of machinery and technical assistance to ensure that their plants operate with the latest available technology. They also will want to import goods and technology to build supporting industries, in effect generating a second wave of industrial development. For the manufacture of many complex products, OPEC countries will still have to buy components for many years. Finally, as the OPEC countries take on each new layer of technology, their Western suppliers will have moved ahead to new technologies—and to new exports for the OPEC countries to absorb.

APPENDIX A

OPEC COUNTRIES TECHNOLOGY-RELATED IMPORTS

			i							Dolding	
Commodities		Group of Thirteen	United States	Canada	Japan	United Kingdom	Germany	France	ltaly	Luxem- bourg	Other Europe:
						The	Thousand US 8				
Power machinery, nonelec-	1972	382,074	115,329	4,553	46,050	77.539	51.202	47 198	15.720	\$46	20.637
trical	1973	506,570	156,562	10,058	67.794	\$6,167	74,561	60,220	28.118	1.017	28,073
	1974	692,513	165,502	11,424	87,294	118,053	133,668	101,498	23.640	1.0.1	SC1.6#
Agricultural machinery, non-	1972	145,452	58,702	561	17.897	32,289	16.842	4.966	12,238	€¥0	3,315
electrical	1973	195,819	60,435	527	35,150	35,778	27.906	10.039	18,765	485	3,737
	1974	318,497	93.662	×43	56.777	42, \$21	69,836	10,549	23,872	4.057	10.080
Office machines	1972	71,655	19,346	426	240,6	11,569	11,875	4.516	5,534	1,579	507.7
	1973	96,520	19,786	1,493	16,445	14,389	14,825	8,621	10,110	1,308	9.543
	1974	148,989	43,502	2.821	23,539	18,359	21,206	9.701	14,898	1.641	13.322
Metalworking machinery	1972	96,342	17,498	121	5,813	7,615	44,140	4.599	11.178	2.141	3,237
	1973	165,808	21,053	366	7,541	7,520	80.456	20,668	12,294	10.840	5.070
	1974	166,278	19,090	115	15,792	11,850	60,215	21,411	22,132	4,551	10.792
Textile and leather machin-	1972	178,235	13,589	326	44.609	24,496	52,648	9,070	12,923	4.750	15, \$24
ery	1973	261,692	20,890	289	67.010	31,546	57,032	11,221	12,768	6.759	24.177
	1974	34.,045	33,370	450	90,586	30.921	107.841	15.326	24,219	8,270	33.092
							Percent				
Power machinery, nonelec-	1972	100.0	30.2	?!	13.1	20.3	13 4	<u>د ا</u>	7	6 13	• • •
trical	1973	100.0	30.9	2.0	13.4	15.8		11.9	. io	: ?! 0	ייו פ
	1974	100.0	23.9	1.6	12.6	17.0	19.3	14.7	3	0.2	() -
Agricultural machinery, non-	1972	103.0	39.0	0.4	12.3	22.2	11.6	3.4	en en	0.4	. ci
electrical	1973	100.0	30.9	0.3	18.0	15.3	14.3	5.1	9.6	0.3	· **
	1974	100. ე	29.4	0.3	17.8	13.4	21.9	5.2	17	1.3	
Office machines	1972	0.001	27.0	9.0	12.6	16.6	16.6	6.3	11.9	6.6	
	1973	100.0	20.5	1.5	17.0	14.9	15.4	8.9	10.5	1.4	о. О
:	1974	100.0	29.5	1.9	15.8	12.3	14.2	6.5	10.0	1.1	9
Metalworking machinery	1972	100.0	18.2	0.1	6.0	7.9	45.8	S.4.	11.6	61 61	÷.
	1973	100.0	12.7	0.2	4.5	٠. ت.	48.5	12.5	+†. -	6.5	
:	1974	100.0	11.5	0.1	9.5	7.1	36.2	12.9	13.3	ن ن ق	ð.5
Textile and leather machin-	1972	100.0	7.6	0.2	25.0	13.7	29.5	5.1	6.7	61	o) on
gry	1973	100.0	8.0	0.1	25.6	12.1	33.3	4.3	6.4	2.6	6.9
	1974	100.0	9.7	0.1	26.3	0.6	31.3	· . 5	0.7	ei ei	9.6

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OPEC COUNTRIES TECHNOLOGY-RELATED IMPORTS (Continued)

Machines for special indus- 1972 438,605 178,158 3,642 tries 1974 1,078,635 383,099 12,909 Machines, nonelectrical, not 1972 1,078,635 383,099 12,909 elswhere specified (NES) 1973 1,335,706 340,212 4,567 elswhere specified (NES) 1973 1,335,706 394,212 4,567 and switchgears 1974 2,094,770 661,550 10,866 Electric power machinery 1972 1973 466,139 92,075 2,217 Bectrical distributing equip- 1972 1973 466,139 92,075 2,217 ment 1973 466,139 92,075 2,17 ment 1974 262,629 29,533 8,51 ment 1973 49,611 49,613 24,077 ment 1973 100,0 330,621 44,176 17,073 ment 1973 100,0 31,6 0.3 Machines, nonelectrical, 1972 100,0 31,6 0.3 NES 1974 100,0 29,5 0.3	İ	Thorse Thorse Thorse Top 144, 366 144, 366 143, 605 163, 950 208, 822 141, 504 162, 645 162 163, 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 162, 476 10, 763	Thousand US 8 14 68.710 6 198.713 8 193.320 8 258.952 8 394.677 9 34.215 7 507 0 134.979 0 134.979 0 134.979 0 134.979 0 134.979 0 134.979 0 134.979	32,500 63,163 117,864 122,137 156,380 251,570 46,353 59,548 100,895 13,239	27, 194 33, 210 67, 593 134, 456 145, 420 234, 609 23, 609 6, 695 11, 470	16, 505 23, 385	
1972 43×,605 175,155 1973 597,167 247,629 1974 1,079,099 340,755 1972 1,035,706 394,212 1973 1,335,706 681,50 1974 2,094,770 661,50 1972 313,895 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 688,722 184,799 1973 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1974 262,629 29,533 1974 702,035 72,192 1974 702,035 72,192 1974 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 33.5 1974 100.0 33.6 1974 100.0 33.6 1974 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 26.5 1974 100.0 26.5 1974 100.0 26.5 1974 100.0 26.5	3.642 6,136 12,909 2,967 4,567 10,866 2,408 7,217 1,933	70,694 75,576 144,365 143,605 163,980 208,822 44,504 62,645 83,870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479	65, 710 59, 560 193, 320 258, 952 394, 677 54, 215 75, 507 134, 979 16, 299 26, 362 54, 617 43, 212	32.500 63,163 117.864 122,137 156,380 251,570 46,383 59,548 100,895 13,239	27, 194 33, 210 67, 593 1134, 456 1145, 420 234, 509 23, 610 30, 633 44, 790 6, 695 11, 470	16,596 23,385	
1973 597,167 247,629 1974 1,078,633 383,099 1972 1,079,099 340,755 1973 1,335,706 394,212 1974 2,094,770 661,550 1972 313,898 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 262,629 29,673 1975 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1973 116,977 14,176 1974 262,629 29,533 1975 100.0 41,5 1974 702,035 72,192 1975 100.0 41,5 1974 100.0 33,5 1975 100.0 31,6 1977 100.0 29,5 1977 100.0 22,4 1972 100.0 22,4 1973 100.0 22,4 1974 100.0 26,5 1974 100.0 26,5 1974 100.0 26,5 1974 100.0 8,4 1973 100.0 8,4 1974 100.0 8,4 1973 100.0 8,4 1974 <td>6, 136 12, 909 2, 967 4, 567 10, 866 2, 408 2, 217 7, 047 1, 933</td> <td>75, 576 144, 366 143, 608 163, 980 208, 822 44, 504 62, 645 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 32, 479 40, 763</td> <td>\$9,560 198,713 193,320 258,952 394,677 78,507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617</td> <td>63, 163 117, S64 122, 137 156, 380 251, 570 46, 383 59, 548 100, S95 13, 239 11, 787</td> <td>33,210 67,593 134,486 145,420 23,610 23,610 44,790 6,693 11,470</td> <td>23.355</td> <td>14.334</td>	6, 136 12, 909 2, 967 4, 567 10, 866 2, 408 2, 217 7, 047 1, 933	75, 576 144, 366 143, 608 163, 980 208, 822 44, 504 62, 645 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 32, 479 40, 763	\$9,560 198,713 193,320 258,952 394,677 78,507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617	63, 163 117, S64 122, 137 156, 380 251, 570 46, 383 59, 548 100, S95 13, 239 11, 787	33,210 67,593 134,486 145,420 23,610 23,610 44,790 6,693 11,470	23.355	14.334
1974 1,078,633 383,099 1972 1,079,099 340,755 1973 1,335,706 394,212 1974 2,094,770 661,550 1972 313,898 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 262,629 29,673 1975 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1973 116,977 14,176 1974 262,629 29,533 1973 100.0 40,613 1974 702,035 72,192 1975 100.0 41,5 1974 100.0 33,5 1975 100.0 31,6 1974 100.0 29,5 1974 100.0 31,6 1975 100.0 22,4 1977 100.0 22,4 1973 100.0 22,4 1974 100.0 26,5 1975 100.0 8,4 1973 100.0 8,4 1974 100.0 8,4 1975 100.0 8,4 1973 100.0 8,4 1974 100.0 8,4 1975	12,909 2,967 1,567 10,866 2,408 2,217 7,047 1,933	144, 365 143, 608 163, 980 208, 822 44, 504 62, 645 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 32, 479 40, 763	198, 713 193, 320 258, 952 394, 677 54, 215 78, 507 16, 299 26, 362 54, 617	117, S64 122, 137 156, 360 251, 570 46, 383 59, 548 90, 895 13, 239 11, 787	67, 593 134, 486 145, 420 234, 809 25, 610 30, 633 44, 790 6, 695 11, 470		15.632
1972 1,079,099 340,755 1973 1,335,706 394,212 1974 2,094,770 661,850 1 1972 313,898 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 688,722 184,799 1975 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1973 459,119 49,613 1974 702,038 72,192 1974 100.0 31.6 1975 100.0 31.6 1974 100.0 31.6 1975 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 29.5 1975 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1975 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1975 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975	2,967 4,567 10,866 2,408 2,217 7,047 1,933	143,605 163,950 208,822 44,504 62,645 83,870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	193.320 258.952 394.677 54.215 75.507 134.979 16.299 26.362 54.617	122,137 156,360 251,570 46,383 59,548 90,595 13,239	134,456 145,420 234,809 25,610 30,633 44,790 6,695 11,470	25.702	35,077
1973 1,335,706 394,212 1974 2,094,770 661,850 1 1972 313,898 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 688,722 184,799 1972 116,977 10,034 1973 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1973 459,119 49,613 1974 702,038 72,192 1974 100.0 31.6 1975 100.0 31.6 1974 100.0 29.5 1975 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1975 100.0 22.4 1977 100.0 22.4 1977 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4 1974 <	4, 567 10, 566 2, 408 2, 217 7, 047 1, 933	163,980 208,822 44,504 62,645 83,870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	258 952 394,677 54,215 78 507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617	156,360 251,570 46,353 59,545 90,595 13,239 11,757	234,809 23,610 25,610 30,633 44,790 6,695 11,470	20.532	35,434
1974 2.094,770 661,550 1972 313,898 70,403 1973 436,139 92,075 1974 688,722 184,799 1972 116,977 10,034 1973 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1975 459,119 49,613 1974 702,035 72,192 1975 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 41.5 1975 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 33.6 1975 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1975 100.0 22.4 1977 100.0 22.4 1977 100.0 26.8 1977 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4 1977 100.0 11.9	10.866 2,408 2,217 7,047 1,933	208, 822 44, 504 62, 645 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 35, 817 40, 763	394,677 54,215 78,507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617	251.570 46,383 59.548 90.895 13.239 11,787	234, 809 25, 610 30, 63: 44, 790 6, 695 11, 470	23,160	54.197
1972 313,898 70,403 2. 1973 436,139 92,075 2. 1974 688,722 184,799 7. 1972 116,977 10,034 1. 1973 116,977 10,034 17. 1974 262,629 29,533 19,613 24. 1973 459,119 49,613 24. 17. 1974 702,035 72,192 8. 1973 100.0 41.5 19. 1974 100.0 31.6 19. 1975 100.0 29.5 19. 1974 100.0 22.4 197. 1975 100.0 22.4 197. 1974 100.0 22.4 197. 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 11. 9.1.	2, 217 7, 047 1, 933	44, 504 62, 645 83, 870 19, 421 26, 638 55, 817 40, 763	54,215 78,507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617 43,212	46,383 59,548 90,895 13,239 11,787	25,610 30,633 44,790 6,695 11,470	28,729	\$6.309
1973 436,139 92,075 2, 1974 688,722 184,799 7. 1972 116,977 10,034 1. 1973 116,977 10,034 17, 1974 262,629 29,533 17, 1973 459,119 49,613 24, 1973 100.0 41.5 8, 1974 100.0 41.5 8, 1974 100.0 32.5 16.6 1973 100.0 31.6 16.5 1974 100.0 29.5 16.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 11.9 <td>2,217 7,047 1,933</td> <td>62,645 83,870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763</td> <td>78 507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617</td> <td>59,545 in0,895 i3,239 i1,787</td> <td>30,63: 44,790 6,695 11,470</td> <td>12.348</td> <td>15.571</td>	2,217 7,047 1,933	62,645 83,870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	78 507 134,979 16,299 26,362 54,617	59,545 in0,895 i3,239 i1,787	30,63: 44,790 6,695 11,470	12.348	15.571
1974 688,722 184,799 7. 1972 96,763 8,142 1. 1973 116,977 10,034 1. 1974 262,629 29,533 19,613 24, 1973 459,119 49,613 24, 17, 1973 100.0 40.6 10.6 1974 100.0 41.5 10.6 1973 100.0 31.6 10.5 1974 100.0 29.5 10.5 1973 100.0 22.4 10.6 1974 100.0 22.4 10.6 1973 100.0 22.4 10.6 1974 100.0 22.4 10.6 1973 100.0 22.4 10.6 1974 100.0 22.4 10.6 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4	7.047	\$3.870 19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	134.979 16.299 26.362 54.617 43.212	100,895 13,239 11,787	44.790 6.695 11,470	18,153	26,522
1972 96,763 8,142 1. 1973 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1972 330,621 44,176 17, 1973 459,119 49,613 24, 1974 702,038 72,192 8, 1973 100.0 41.5 8, 1974 100.0 33.5 10,6 1973 100.0 31.6 10,6 1974 100.0 22.4 10,2 1973 100.0 22.4 10,6 1974 100.0 22.4 10,6 1973 100.0 26.8 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4	1,933	19,421 26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	16.299 26.362 54.617 43.212	13,239	6.695	15.924	32,729
1973 116,977 10,034 1974 262,629 29,533 1972 330,621 44,176 17, 1973 459,119 49,613 24, 1974 702,038 72,192 8, 1975 160,0 40.6 10.6 1974 100,0 41.5 10.6 1975 100,0 33.5 10.6 1974 100,0 22.4 107.0 1972 100,0 22.4 107.0 1973 100,0 22.4 107.0 1974 100,0 22.4 107.0 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1975 100.0 8.4	956	26,638 55,817 32,479 40,763	26.362 54.617 43.212	11,757	11,470	695	6.908
1974 262,629 29,533 1972 330,621 44,176 17,176 1973 459,119 49,613 24,176 1974 702,038 72,192 8, 1972 160.0 40.6 40.6 1973 100.0 41.5 40.6 1974 100.0 35.5 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 40.6 1974 100.0 22.4 40.6 1972 100.0 22.4 40.6 1973 100.0 22.4 40.6 1974 100.0 22.4 40.6 1973 100.0 26.8 40.6 1974 100.0 8.4 40.6 1973 100.0 8.4 40.6 1974 100.0 8.4 40.6 1973 100.0 8.6 8.4 1974 100.0 8.6 8.4	001	55,817 32,479 40,763	54.617			1,679	7.174
1972 330,621 44,176 17,195 1973 459,119 49,613 24,192 1974 702,035 72,192 8, 1972 160.0 40.6 41.5 1973 100.0 41.5 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 41.6 1974 100.0 22.4 41.6 1972 100.0 22.4 41.1 1974 100.0 22.4 41.1 1973 100.0 26.8 41.1 1974 100.0 8.4 41.2 1973 100.0 8.4 41.2 1973 100.0 8.4 41.2 1973 100.0 8.4 41.2		32,479 40,763	43.212	22,341	23,397	5.074	25,667
1973 459,119 49,613 24, 1974 702,035 72,192 8, 1972 160.0 40.6 41.5 1973 100.0 41.5 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 41.6 1974 100.0 22.4 41.6 1972 100.0 22.4 41.6 1974 100.0 22.4 41.1 1974 100.0 26.8 41.1 1972 100.0 8.4 41.2 1973 100.0 8.4 41.2 1974 100.0 8.4 41.2 1973 100.0 8.4 41.2 1974 100.0 8.4 41.1		40,763		29,627	24,505	10.186	58,168
1974 702,035 72,192 8. 1972 160.0 40.6 41.5 1973 100.0 41.5 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 35.5 1972 100.0 31.6 31.6 1974 100.0 29.5 41.5 1972 100.0 22.4 41.6 1973 100.0 22.4 41.1 1974 100.0 26.8 41.1 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4			18.311	40,624	22,301	18,493	38,777
1972 160.0 40.6 1973 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 41.5 1972 100.0 33.5 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 26.8 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.6		65,910	96,780	76,285	28,582	15,328	57,422
1972 160.0 40.6 1973 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 1972 100.0 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 26.8 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4		Д	Dergent				
1972 160.0 40.6 1973 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 1972 100.0 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 26.8 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4							
1973 100.0 41.5 1974 100.0 35.5 1972 100.0 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 26.5 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 11.9	40.6 0.8 6.1	16.1	15.7	-7. 1-	0.2	8.8	3.3
1974 100.0 35.5 1972 100.0 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 22.4 1974 100.0 21.1 1972 100.0 26.5 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 11.9		13.2	15.0	10.6	5.6	3.9	3.1
1972 100.0 31.6 1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 29.5 1972 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 21.1 1974 100.0 26.5 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 11.9		13.4	18.4	10.9	6.3	ċ1	3.3
1973 100.0 29.5 1974 100.0 31.6 1972 100.0 22.4 1973 100.0 21.1 1974 100.0 26.5 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 11.9	0.3	13.3	17.9	11.3	12.5	1.9	3.6
1974 100.0 31.6 1972 100.0 22.4 1973 160.0 21.1 1974 100.0 26.5 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.4 1974 100.0 11.9	0.3	12.3	19.4	11.7	10.9	1.7	
1972 100.0 22.4 1973 160.0 21.1 1974 100.0 26.8 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.6 1974 100.0 11.9	0.5	10.0	18.8	12.0	11.2	1.4	₩.
1973 100.0 21.1 1974 100.0 26.5 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.6 1974 100.0 11.9	§.0	14.2	17.3	14.8	S. 5	3.9	5.0
1974 100.0 26.8 1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.6 1974 100.0 11.9	0.5	14.4	18.0	13.7	0.7	다. 구	6.1
1972 100.0 8.4 1973 100.0 8.6 1974 100.0 11.9		12.2	19.6	14.6	6.5	2.3	7
1973 100.0 8.6	2.0	20.1	16.8	13.7	6.9	0.7	7.1
6 11 9		22.8	22.5	10.1	8.6	1.4	6.1
2.11		21.3	20.8	8.5	8.9	1.9	8.6
13.4		8.6	13.1	9.0	+ .	3.1	11.5
10.8	5.2	6.8	17.1	8.8	6.7	÷.	- -
1974 100.0 10.3 1.3		¥.6	13.8	10.3	4.1	01 01	oi V

OPEC COUNTRIES
TECHNOLOGY-RELATED IMPORTS (Continued)

Commodities		Group of Thirteen	United States	Canada	Japan	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Italy	Beigium Luxem- bourg	Other Europe !
		İ				Th	Thousand US \$				
Electromedical X-ray equip-	1972	14,844	4,306	172	526	1.052	5,563	1,863	545	6.5	991
ment	1973	18,180	4.798	161	91S	1.656	6.806	2.985	632	i c	956
	1974	24,728	7,344	103	1, 407	2,564	8.331	3,409	SOF	384) 10 70 50
Electrical machinery, NES	1972	208,728	45,538	2,351	30,213	33,241	45,655	32,436	10,293	1.44	7,553
	1973	294,481	62,625	8,448	39.308	37.159	75,286	46.136	12.084	2,295	11.110
	1974	405,675	60.05	4.90.2	67,348	53.780	84,602	62.863	17.130	4.351	26.620
Railway vehicles	1972	26,451	3,305	9,477	2,452	2.011	4, 126	3.527	292	233	1.028
	1973	45,253	18.589	7,241	2.262	3,223	6.707	3.349	3,152	316	-11
	1974	77,051	30,176	430	3,284	2.299	4,150	25,899	8.557	1.907	53±50
Road motor vehicles	1972	1,225.793	257 493	83,127	209,002	171,854	247,117	137,629	80.294	7,936	31.341
	1973	1,675,631	331,360	48,439	343,462	216,344	380,435	198,985	107.822	\$.094	40.690
	1974	3.128,903	538,353	118,115	678,590	260,454	798,039	450,707	154.305	16,223	\$3,117
Road vehicles, nonmotor	1972	53,918	6,515	:	7.003	17,727	6,511	4.385	9.266	691	1.820
	1973	67.382	5,728	887	8,155	18,024	11.730	6,078	11.358	4.457	935
	1974	146,744	29,166	1,114	12,116	17,678	39.249	14,234	25,492	3,667	4.025
							Percent				
Electromedinil X-ray equip-	1972	100.0	29.0	1.3	3.5	بن ا۔	37.5	13.6	نن د ا	: :0	-1
ment	1973	100.0	26.4	1.1	4.5	9.1	37.4	16.4	.c.	¥.0	: ?! :
	1974	100.0	29.7	1.0	5.1	10.4	33.7	13.8	ري ن	1.6	1.6
Electrical machinery, NES	1972	100.0	21.8		14.5	15.9	21.9	15.5	6. T	1.0	3.6
	1973	100.0	21.3	6. 6.	13.3	12.6	25.6	15.7	1.1	0.8	3.8
	1974	100.0	22.2	1.2	15.6	13.3	20.9	15.5	€1.	1.1	5.1
Railway vehicles	1972	100.0	12.5	35.8	9.3	9.5	15.6	13.3	1.:	6.0	٥ ۲.
	1973	100.0	41.1	16.0	5.0	7.1	14.8	1 .	7.0	0.7	6.0
	1974	100.0	39.2	9.0	4.3	3.0	5.4	33.6	11.1	2.5	0.5
Road motor vehicles	1972	100.0	21.0	8.9	17.1	14.0	20.3	11.2	9.9	9.0	(C)
	1973	100.0	19.8	2.9	20.5	12.9	22.7	11.9	6.4	0	ائ با
	1974	100.0	17.3	3.8	21.7	8.3	25.5	14.4	5.9	0.5	71
Road vehicles, nonmotor	1972	100.0	12.1	;	13.0	32.9	12.1	8.1	17.3	1.3	573 - 144
	1973	100.0	8.5		12.1	26.7	17.4	0.6	16.9	9.1	
	1974	100.0	19.9	8.0	8.3	12.0	26.7	17.6	17.4	2.5	1-, ?1
Footnote at and of table											

OPEC COUNTRIES
TECHNOLOGY-RELATED IMPORTS (Continued)

Commodines		Group of Thirteen	United States	Canada	Japan	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Italy	Belgium Luxem- bourg	Other Europe ¹
						Tho	Thousand US 8				
Aircraft	1972	294,353	167,731	21,952	5,765	28,505	งิจิจิ	41.704	23,656	4.361	ţĢ
	1973	296,196	160.934	2.302	124	44.081	569	49,210	36,493	2.377	106
	1974	549,410	330,779	9.205	199	55.883	7,624	73,442	69,664	2.200	1 14
Ships and boats	1972	109,482	14,533	149	61,196	1,384	13,879	3,574	4.924	6,251	3.592
	1973	141,602	10.032	11	31,616	4,123	41,355	25,869	17,898	90	10.684
	1974	215,308	24,051	50	98,681	24,584	+0.206	10.632	10,784	14	6.25°
Scientific instruments and	1972	144,817	42,600	6+9	14,341	27,791	26,672	16.347	7,009	2,476	6.932
apparatus	1973	191,531	49,564	2,473	19,606	28,540	43,078	24.386	9.718	2,401	16.965
	1974	285,601	65,072	935	38,777	36,387	65,455	44.887	14.226	2.825	17.037
Column sums	1972	5,211,130	1,406,119	151,887	720,423	748,199	902,541	555,760	418.362	94.017	213,912
	1973	6,901,773	1,715,919	119.984	1,044.589	895,182	1,383,238	377,662	524,247	125,333	294.032
	1974	11,330,536	2,802,619	191,085	1,894,182	1,234,448	2.320.188	1,419,513	839.200	142,794	456.507
							Percent				
Aircraft	1972	100.0	57.0	7.5	2.0	1.6	0.3	1 1	8.0		Negl.
	1973	100.0	54.3	8.0	Negl.	14.9	0.3	16.6	12.3	8.0	Neg.
	1974	100.0	60.2	1.7	Negl.	10.2	Ŧ* . I	13.4	12.7	0.4	0.1
Ships and boats	1972	100.0	13.3	0.1	55.9	1.3	12.7	3.3	ا . ت	5.7	3.3
	1973	100.0	7.1	Negl.	25.3	9.6	29.2	18.3	12.6	Negl.	7.5
	1971	100.0	11.2	Negl.	45.8	11.4	18.7	4.9	5.0	Negl.	9.9
Scientific instruments and	1972	100.0	29.4	1.0	6.9	19.2	18.4	11.3	4.8	1.7	95; 95;
apparatus	1973	100.0	25.9	1.3	10.2	14.9	9.5.9	12.7	5.1	1.3	5.7
	1974	100.0	37.5	0.3	13.6	12.7	22.9	15.7	5.0	1.0	6.0
Column sums	1972	100.0	27.0	2.9	13.8	14.4	17.3	10.7	8.0	1.8	7
	1973	100.0	24.9	1.7	15.1	13.0	20.0	11.6	9.7	1.8	4.3
	101	100 0	1.00	-	4	0 01	11 000	2	•		

¹ Including Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

APPENDIX B

OPEC COUNTRIES: SPENDING PLANS AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY

	Billion US \$	Percent		
Algeria				
Investment planned for 1974-77:				
Total	27.7	100.0		
Industry	12.1	43.7		
Agriculture	3.0	10.8		
Infrastructure and power	5.0	18.0		
Social services	6.2	22.4		
Other	1.4	5.1		
	Probable Contr	actors	Major Purpose	Amount (Million US \$)
Major projects involving foreign technology:				
Three liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants	United States, U	nited	Export	500
(515.6 billion cubic feet by 1980)	Kingdom		DAPOR	300
Several gas pipelines	Italy		Export	••••
Expansion of refinery capacity (550,000	Japan, Italy, Uni	ited	Export	550
b/d by 1979)	Kingdom			
Petrochemical plants (fertilizer and plastics)			Domestic	••••
Expansion of steel production	Janen, Sweden, 1	USSR	Domestic	****
Electronics complex (motors, home enter- tainment units)	United States		Domestic	250
Expansion of automotive production (motors and chassis for trucks, buses, and autos) Telecommunications	West Germany, I	France	Domestic	200
Microwave system under construction	Japan, France		Domestic	••••
Telephone and circuit manufacture (140,000 telephones, 100,000 circuits)	Spain		Domestic	····
	Million US \$	Percent		
Ecuador				
Investment planned for 1975:				
Total	165.0	100.0		
Public works	77.4	46.9		
Natural resources	8,0	4.8		
Agriculture	74.8	45.3		
Industry and commerce	4.8	2.9		
	Probable Contra	actuss	Major Purpose	Amount (Million US \$)
Major projects involving foreign technology:				
FT4C gas turbine plant	United States		Domestic	
Thermal powerplant	Japan		Domestic	9.4
I I	- up		Domostic	7.4

APPENDIX B

OPEC COUNTRIES: SPENDING PLANS AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY (Continued)

	Billion US \$	Percent		
Iran				
hivestment planned for 1973-77:				
Totai	69.6	100.0		
Economic affa rs	44.9	64,5		
Industry	11.5	16.5		
Oil and gas	11.6	16.7		
Transportation and communications	7.3	10.5		
Agriculture	4.6	6.6		
Electricity	4.6	6.6		
Water	2.5	3.6		
Telecommunications	1.4	2.0		
Mines	1.0	1.4		
Tourism	0.4	0.6		
Public affairs	5.6	8.0		
Social affairs	19.1	27.4		
	B 1 11 G			Amount
	Probable Contra	ictors	Major Purpose	(Billion US \$)
Major projects involving foreign technology:				
Petrochemical plants	United States		Domestic	2.0
Petrochemical plant	Japan		Export	1.9
Methanol plant	United States		Domestic	0.2
Special steels plant	t-rance		Domestic	0.2
Integrated steel plant	United Kingdom		Domestic	1.7
Steelmaking complex	Italy		Domestic	3.0
Port construction, Bandar Abbas	Italy		Domestic	1.0
Nuclear powerplants	West Germany, F	rance	Domestic	2.0
Copper mining	United States		Domestic	1.0
Natural gas complex	United States, Ja		Export	5.9
Refinery (200,000 b/d)	United States, Wo Germany	est	Domestic	
Oil and gas pipelines	France		Domestic	0.1
Crude oil pipelines	Italy		Domestic	0.2
Crude oil pipeline	United States		Domestic	0.1
Telecommunications (telephones)	United States		Domestic	9.6
	Billion US \$	Percent		
Lean.	•			
Iraq Investment planned for 1976-80				
Total	34.0	100.0		
Oil, gas, and other industry	8.0	23.5		
Agriculture, including reclamation and rural roads	16.0	47.1		
Transportation and communications	5.0	14.7		
Building and services	5.0	14.7		

APPENDIX B

OPEC COUNTRIES: SPENDING PLANS AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY (Continued)

		Major Purpose	(Billion US \$)
Japan		Domestic/export	••••
Japan, Italy		Domestic/export	••••
Denmark			••••
Japan		Export	••••
Erono		Chamantia	
			••••
Prance, Japan		Domestic	••••
France		Domestic	
,		Domestic	••••
France, Sweden		Domestic	••••
Billion US \$	Percent		
8.7	100.0		
* * * *			
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
= -			
1.0	11.3		
Probable Contrac	etors	Major Purpose	Amount (Million US \$
		, .	
United Kingdom		Domestic	200
-		Domestic	
West Germany		Domestic/export	90
••••		Domestic	142
****		Domestic	500
Italy		Export	450
	Percent		
1			
4			
	Japan, Italy Denmark Japan France France, Japan France, Sweden Billion US \$ 8.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.0 Probable Contract United Kingdom West Germany	Japan, Italy Denmark Japan	Japan, Italy Denmark Japan France France, Japan France, Sweden Billion US \$ Percent 8.7 100.0 1.9 21.8 1.8 20.7 1.7 19.5 2.3 26 4 1.0 11.5 Probable Contractor: West Germany West Germany West Germany West Germany Major Purpose United Kingdom Domestic

APPENDIX B OPEC COUNTRIES: SPENDING PLANS AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY (Continued)

	Billion US \$	Percent	
eria (continued)			
Power	1.7	2.4	
Commerce and finance	1.0	1.4	
Transportation and communications	21.7	31.2	
Social infrastructure	7.9	11.4	
Regional development	6.7	9.6	
Administration and other	7.2	10.3	

^{1.} The Wigerian government has announced a \$2, billion cutback in this program. The government now wants to spend \$32 billion and have the private sector contigute \$16 billion.

	Probable Contractors	Major Purpose	Amount (Billion US \$)
Major projects involving foreign technology:			
Two LNG plants, each 600 million cubic feet per day	United States, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom	Export	1-2
Three refineries, total planned output 185,000 b/d		Domestic	0.6
Iron and steel 1.5 million tons per year	USSR	Domestic	1.3
Electric power, thermal and hydroelectric	••••	Domestic	1.7
Communications, expansion of automatic exchange facilities	United States	Domestic	1.3

	Billion US \$	Percent
audi Arabia		
Investment planned for 1975-80:		
Total	68.5¹	100.0
Economic resource development	24.9	36.4
Water and related electric power	9.6	14.0
Agriculture	0.6	0.9
Petroleum and minerals	0.4	0.6
Other electric power	0.5	0.7
Manufacturing	13.6	19.9
Other public works	0.2	0.3
Education	10.3	15.0
Social services	4.3	6,3
Physical infrastructure	29.0	42.3
Roads	3.1	4.5
Ports	2.0	2.9
Airports	3.6	5.3
Municipal government projects	13.2	19.3
Housing	4.1	60
Holy City and Hadj	1.4	2.0
Other	1.6	2.3

^{1.} For capital projects within planned governmental expenditures of \$142 billion.

APPENDIX B OPEC COUNTRIES: SPENDING PLANS AND DEMAND FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY (Continued)

	Probable Cont.	ractors	Major Purpose	Amount (Billion US S
Major projects involving foreign technology:				
Water desalinization and power	Japan, West Ger France, United		Domestic	7.2
Gas-gathering and treatment	United States		Domestic/export	4.6
Five petrochemical complexes	United States, Japan		Export	3.2
Three export refineries	United States, Japan		Export	1.9
Refinery expansion	United States		Export	0.8
Lube oil refinery	United States		Domestic	0.6
Four fertilizer plants	United Kingdom, Tai- wan, United States		Domestic	0.4
Aluminum plants	****		Domestic	0.4
Steel plant (3.5 million tons per year)	United States, Netherlands, West Germany, Japan		Domestic	1.6
Crude oil pipeline	United States	•	Domestic/export	1.5
LNG pipeline	United States		Domestic/export	0.3
Health (hospitals and equipment)	United States		Domestic	3.5
Communications	France, United S	States	Domestic	0.9
	Billion US \$	Percent		
Venezuela				
Investment planned for 1975-79:				
Total	36.6	100.0		
Social services and finance	13.3	36.3		
Manufacturing	9.3	25.4		
Agriculture	5.1	13.9		
Petroleum and mining	1.6	4.4		
Misce!!'nneous	7.3	19.9		
	Probable Contr	actors	Major Purpose	Amount
Major projects involving foreign technology:				
Petrochemical plants (fertilizer)	United States		Export	****
Expansion of steel production (10 million tons by 1980)	United States		Export	,
Expansion of aluminum production (900,000 tons by 1980)	United States, Japan		Export	
Agricultural machinery (6,000 tractors and 10,000 diesel engines annually)			Domestic	